The South China Sea Diplomacy

THE recent joint statement by President Prabowo Subianto and Chinese President Xi Jinping shows a pragmatism relating to foreign policy that has the potential to disadvantage Indonesia. Trapped by his ambition to attract major investment from China, Prabowo seems to have ignored the major risk behind his diplomatic maneuvering.

In the China-Indonesia joint statement, the two heads of state agreed to explore cooperation in the maritime region they said had ‘overlapping claims’. Although it was not explained explicitly, it is fairly clear that the region they are referring to is related to China’s unilateral claim over 90 percent of the South China Sea.

Geographically, the waters claimed by China include part of Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) based on the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Although international shipping is allowed in its EEZ, Indonesia has full rights to exploit its natural resources.

In 2016, the International Arbitral Tribunal found that China’s claim, which was based solely on the imaginary ‘nine-dash line’ had no legal basis. As a response to China’s illegal claim, in 2017 Indonesia even changed the area’s official name from the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea.

Indonesia’s urgent need for foreign investment seems to have been the main reason behind Prabowo’s accommodative stance toward China. It is undeniable that China is a major trading and investment partner for Indonesia. In the last few years, China has poured billions of dollars into a number of strategic projects in Indonesia.

The problem is that dependence on Chinese investment brings a major risk for Indonesia, given China’s reputation for using debt trap diplomacy strategy in its international relations. If it is not managed carefully, investment and loans from China could weaken Indonesia’s strategic position. In the worst possible case, Indonesia could find it difficult to take strategic decisions related to China.

Prabowo’s move also has the potential to damage Indonesia’s credibility in the eyes of neighboring countries and the international community. Indonesia has long been known as a nation that consistently rejects unilateral claims in the South China Sea and holds international law in high esteem. This strategy of ‘flirting’ with China could wreck Indonesia’s reputation as a key supporter of multilateral mechanisms in resolving territorial disputes.

Furthermore, cozying up to China over a sensitive issue like the South China Sea could easily lead to tensions with other nations that have strategic interests in the region, including the United States, Japan, and Australia. In the long term, Indonesia also faces the risk of being trapped in geopolitical rivalry between major powers, which could threaten its position as a non-alignment nation.

Pragmatic diplomacy may be important in the face of increasingly uncertain global economic and political challenges. However, it must not sacrifice long-term interests or the values that have long been the basis for Indonesian foreign policy.